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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (9 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670474 17 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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9th Infantry Division

3

HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-MH July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65)

TO: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCS-MH
APO San Francisco 96307

The inclosed Operational Report-Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with paragraph 6d, Appendix II, USARV Regulation Number 870-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/R. L. Phelps
t/R. L. PHELPS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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1. (U) Introduction

a. Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS/CSFOR-65).

b. Location: Vicinity, Long Thanh North (YS 164998), RVN.

c. Reporting Officer: Major General George S. Eckhardt.

d. Prepared by: 19th Military History Detachment.

2. (U) Activation through Deployment

a. Approval for activation of the 9th Infantry Division was issued by Department of the Army[1] on 22 January 1966. The division was activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 1 February 1966 by Fifth US Army General Order 22 dated 26 January 1966, as a standard ROAD division with eight infantry and one mechanized battalion.

b. Included in the DA message authorizing activation, was authority to assign 2200 individuals receiving basic training in a provisional basic training brigade at Fort Riley to the 9th Division. These individuals had originally been programmed for assignment to the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado.

c. The plan for training the division provided for units to conduct basic combat (BCT), advanced individual (AIT), basic unit (BUT), and advanced unit (AUT) training in three major increments. Each increment was to consist of a brigade headquarters, three maneuver battalions, a 105mm artillery battalion and a proportionate share of the combat service and combat service support elements of the division.

d. Automatic issue of basic TOE items (rifle, bayonet, scabbards and protective masks) was effected prior to commencement of BCT. Fifty percent of authorized equipment was issued during BCT and the remainder issued during AIT.

e. The division staff was satellited on the Fort Riley Staff initially, to release as many personnel as possible to training increments during early organization.

f. DA indicated that cadre personnel would be late. Resulting cadre shortages, MOS and grade imbalances of cadre assigned, necessitated the first change to the training program. To resolve this shortcoming General Eckhardt directed CO, Division Artillery to organize a basic training committee. The committee was organized using cadre resources then assigned to the second and third increments. This committe presented rifle qualification instruction, bayonet, hand-to-hand combat, and hand grenade training to newly inducted trainees. Although planned starting dates for BCT could not be realized, the training committee facilitated a more rapid schedule than would otherwise have been possible.

g. As the 2200 BCT trained personnel originally programmed for the 5th Division (M) were assigned to the division in February, a majority were placed in schools to acquire hard skills (skills requiring ten or more weeks training). Remaining soldiers from this group were placed in non-divisional units with the ultimate goal of providing the division with as many school trained soldiers as possible.

h. During March and April 1966, the division received two thousand AIT trained personnel who were not programmed. Many of these soldiers were sent to division base units and others were sent to schools to develop hard skills. Approximately two hundred of these soldiers were trained engineers

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[1]Message, DCSPER (FOUO), DA 748172, Headquarters, Department of the Army, subject Activation of 9th Division, dated 222137Z, January 1966.

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and became the nucleus of the 15th Engineer Battalion scheduled to commence training with the third increment in July.

i. In March the division was informed by USCONARC that 2,930 AIT trained fillers would be provided for the units in the third increment, thereby enabling these elements to organize and go directly into unit (AUT/BUT) training. This action had an impact on both the training and logistical support of the third increment. It meant that the third increment would commence training in July with BUT rather than BCT and that 100 percent of the TOE equipment for this increment would have to be on hand at that time. It also placed a burden on the support command as it meant that the 3d Brigade support slice would have to be trained and ready to function.

j. The first cycle of BCT in the division commenced training on 11 April. Each division unit was then phased into training on a progressive schedule (Appendix 2, Phases of Training). Emphasis during BCT was placed on development of physical fitness and basic fundamentals of soldiering. Tactical foot marches and bivouacs were injected early in the training program. After completion of the first eight weeks of training, BCT graduates were given two weeks leave.

k. In May the division was alerted[2] for deployment to Southeast Asia. Subsequently a request was received from MACV to have the engineer battalion in country by September to assist in preparing base camp areas for arrival of the division. Fortunately, four hundred fillers had already been assigned to the engineer battalion. These men and cadre left the battalion six hundred short of authorized strength. Although they had been scheduled to commence AIT by 4 August, two companies began BUT in June. The battalion was able to complete basic training, command maintenance management inspections and its operational readiness test in August, and deploy by the end of September.

l. A plan from MACV also indicated the 9th Division would be actively engaged in riverine warfare. As very little doctrine was available about riverine warfare and the division was already operating under an accelerated training schedule, plans were made to develop doctrine and modify organizations in RVN.

m. General Eckhardt directed that the division and post staffs be separated on 1 July 1966. The significant impact was the requirement to train the division staff to become self-sufficient and retention of a post staff to administer deployment of thirty-three units during the following year.

n. When the division was activated, it was not a deploying unit; therefore, there was no requirement established that personnel assigned had to be deployable to RVN. Consequently, many Vietnam returnees and personnel returning from Korea and other unaccompanied tour areas were assigned. The division was informed initially that deployability criteria would be as outlined in DA Circular 614-8. This was later amended during a meeting of the ACofS, G1, and representatives of Fifth Army, US CONARC and DA which resulted in a loss of 2,284 non-deployable personnel including almost half of the cadre.

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[2]Message, CSFOR (CONF), DA 63434, Headquarters, Department of the Army, subject: Warning Order-Deployment toSEA(Southeast Asia), dated 04 2208Z May 1966.

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o. The division's aggressive support of the officer candidate school program also had a considerable impact in filling NCO leadership positions. The loss of four hundred of the best soldiers in the division to the program virtually removed the top layer of potential leaders.

p. The last two battalions in the division to be given a BCT mission were the general support artillery battalion, the 3d Battalion, 28th Artillery (Honest John) and the 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery (155/8-inch). There was a critical shortage of cadre and supervisory personnel for these battalions and little prospect for improvement. As a consequence the command and staff resources were consolidated under the senior commander in a battalion group. In effect, this organization conducted BCT for six batteries (four from the 1-84 Artillery and two from the 3-28 Artillery). The 3-28 Artillery was reduced to zero strength effective 25 August 1966, and its personnel were transferred to other division organizations.

q. Division strength as of 24 June was (authorized/assigned): 928/694 Officers, 128/70 Warrant Officer, and 14,506/17,072 Enlisted Men for an aggregate strength of 15,562/17,836 personnel. At this time the division was short 2,738 reportable items of equipment.

r. On 12 July 1966, DA provided an MTOE for the division's review. The MTOE provided four rifle companies, a headquarters company, and a combat support company in each infantry battalion. The MTOE created approximately 1200 additional spaces in the division. DA withheld authority to organize the fourth rifle company until the availability of resources could be determined.

s. Before unexpected assignment of troops in February and April, the division had made provisions to receive one hundred percent of cadre and filler personnel strength plus a five percent overage to accomodate losses to OCS, administrative and hardship discharges, etc. Some of these personnel were just completing BCT as part of the overstrength created by eliminating the Honest John Battalion and other deployable personnel were available in Fort Riley, STAFF and CONUS operating units. Although there had been a short fall in personnel programmed for the 3d Brigade, sufficient personnel were available on station to form companies created by the MTOE.

t. General Eckhardt, based on these factors, determined it necessary to immediately reorganize existing resources into the new MTOE structure and fill the six hundred vacancies created the shortfall in personnel programmed for the 3d Brigade.

u. The brigade commanders then adjusted their training programs to compensate for a small cross section of personnel who had completed BCT but were assigned to units entering the BUT phase of training. This especially held true in the 1st Brigade which had just completed AIT and the 3d Brigade which would not conduct AIT.

v. When the 3d Brigade entered the unit training cycle, the range and training areas became overcrowded. This situation was eased by culmination of action taken by Fort Riley Post earlier in the year to increase the size of the reservation by fifty thousand acres (Appendix 3, Sketch Map, Fort Riley). Fort Riley responded to other training requirements of the division by constructing seven squad live fire tactical ranges, five rotary wing aircraft mockups, and one replica of a Vietnamese village consisting of 19 huts, a boat dock, and tunnel complex.

w. On 16 July an advance movement directive was published by division establishing equipment and personnel readiness dates.

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[3]Letter, AMRD-GT (FOUO), Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, subject: Advance Movement Directive, dated 16 July 1966.

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x. Project "Helping Hand", was initiated on 20 July 1966, between division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The project was designed to facilitate an exchange of information between command and staff organizations of the two units. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided much helpful information concerning tactical operations, and civil affairs/psychological activities during the project.

y. On 8 August, information concerning logistical preparation for overseas movement was published (Appendix 4, Logistical Preparation for Overseas Movement). This directive provided definitive guidance on actions to be taken before and after receipt of orders, packing and marking equipment and other general information.

z. The 9th Military Intelligence, 18 and 19th Public Information Detachments were organized on 15 August 1966, for attachment to the division.

aa. Provisional advance planning group consisting of officer representatives from operations, logistics, signal, civil affairs, and engineer elements of the division arrived in Vietnam in late August. This group, headed by Brigadier General Morgan G. Rosetorough (Appendix 5, Instructions for Liaison Group), was instrumental in providing information on which to guide training and preparation of the division for deployment.

bb. Division strength as of 30 September was (authorized/assigned): 987/867 Officers, 175/91 Warrant Officers, 14,721/15,610 Enlisted Men for an aggregate strength of 15,883/16,568 personnel (Appendix 6, Critical MOS Shortages). At this time the division was short 1,097 reportable items of equipment.

cc. Other training restrictions imposed centered around the lack of mission essential equipment and the national shore supply of certain types of ammunition. Signal equipment and repair parts for signal equipment were a major problem. Major end items were not issued with component parts, i.e., power cables, crystals, generators, etc, required to make them operational. the lack of communication equipment virtually eliminated the capability of establishing intelligence and logistical nets to train personnel in the major command and control system. The communication equipment problem was alleviated somewhat by loan and lateral transfer of some of the required equipment by Fifth Army. The status of other essential equipment was expedited by a liaison team from the Army Material Command which was established at Fort Riley on 3 September.

dd. Command Maintenance Management Inspections were conducted by Fifth US Army between 1 August and 21 October 1966. Only four of the 101 individual units inspected required reinspection. Material readiness of all equipment within the division upon deployment was satisfactory.

ee. The plan for processing for overseas movement (Appendix 7, Administrative Order 2 and 4 (POM)) outlined in detail the actions that were to be taken by each unit. A POM inspection was conducted for each increment by division units and Fort Riley Post. After completion of the POM inspection each increment packed and separated equipment for deployment. Equipment was categorized as General Cargo, Red Circle, or Yellow Disc. Conex containers were used to pack General Cargo (unit impediments shipped with unaccompanied vehicles) and Red Circle (cargo which was to accompany troops on the same vessel or arrive simultaneously. Yellow Disc Cargo was hand carried.

ff. The major influx of aviators for the 9th Aviation Battalion arrived in September and October 1966. Airmobile training conducted prior to their arrival was supported by the 176th Aviation Company from Fort Benning, Georgia. The late arrival of organic aircraft caused problems in aviator transition and unit training of the battalion. Approximately twenty-five

aviators assigned required twenty-five hours transition training in the UH1 and the remainder of aviators assigned required a minimum of one hour standardization training. A large percentage of aviators were received directly from flight school which necessitated several hours of additional training and orientation. Due to airmobile training committments for the brigades, much of the aviator training had to be combined with this support.

gg. As of 1 November 1966, the personnel and equipment status of the division had shown some improvement (Appendix 8, Personnel , MOS and equipment Shortages).

hh. The division moved overseas (Appendix 9, Division Deployment Schedule) by air (advance party) and surface (main body) transportation. Included in each advance party were approximately two hundred junior leaders who received on-the-job-training with their counterparts in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade, 1st and 25th Divisions. This program proved invaluable in acquainting a cross section of the division with the combat environment in Vietnam.

ii. The official arrival of the division was celebrated on 19 December 1966, when support units of the division devarked the USNS Barrett at Vung Tau, Vietnam. General Eckhardt presented the division to General William C. Westmoreland who addressed debarking troops and welcomed the division to Vietnam.

jj. Division personnel were transported (Appendix 10, Arrival of 9th Division) to the division base camp by truck convoy. The two hour and forty-five minute journey went north along National Route 15 to Camp Martin Cox located near Long Thanh North (YS 1600). The final element closed on 31 January 1967.

kk. A total of 16,524 personnel and their Red Circle TAT equipment and approximately 250 Conex containers and 1,268 short tons of cargo debarked from eight MSTS troop transports at Vung Tau. At the Saigon Port twenty-three transports discharged 28,386 long tons of unit impedimenta and equipment which included 2,945 wheeled vehicles, 2,326 trailers, 313 tracked vehicles, 90 other major items of equipment, 62 howitzers and 1,631 Conex containers.

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4. (FOUO) Personnel

a. During the period of this report the enlisted posture of the division has been excellent. However, the problem of shortages of Captains and NCO's grade (E-5) prior to deployment has been further aggrevated by a casualty rate which has exceeded the rate of fill. The rotational hump (Nov 67-Jan 68) has been eased by participation in the USARV infusion program. As of 30 April 128 officers and 1600 enlisted personnel had been infused. This represents completion of approximately one-third of the infusion program. Shortly after arrival in country it became readily apparent that sufficient personnel were not provided in the division ROAD Organization to support base camp activities. Approval of a recommended base camp augmentation was received and implements at the close of the reporting period.

b. Division strength as of 30 April 1967:

	OFF Auth/Asg	EM Auth/Asg
HHC, 1st Bde	29/26	100/126
HHC, 2d Bde	/32	/182
HHC, 3d Bde	/29	/110
HHB, Div Arty	50/48	173/198
HHBand, DISCOM	19/18	104/121
2-39 Inf	42/38	776/818
3-39 Inf	/37	/843
4-39 Inf	/40	/843
2-47 Inf (M)	39/35	860/922
3-47 Inf	42/40	776/806
4-47 Inf	/40	/796
2-60 Inf	/39	/825
3-60 Inf	/36	/846
5-60 Inf (M)	39/35	860/987
1-11 Arty	42/39	460/455
2-4 Arty	/40	/462
3-34 Arty	/41	/465
1-84 Arty(155/8)	29/30	582/569
3-5 Cav	81/71	873/979
9 Avn Bn	107/81	302/339
9 Sig Bn	29/30	628/666
9 MP Co	10/11	181/195
15 Engr Bn	42/48	934/1029
9 Admin Co	45/46	378/641
9 S&T Bn	28/29	462/472

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9 Med Bn	40/39	366/392
709 Maint Bn	47/46	778/868
HHC, 9th Inf Div	47/66	109/190
Total	1163/1111	14720/16191

c. Statistical Analysis of Casualties as of 30 April 1967.

(1) Time

	KIA	WIA
0001-0200	3	32
0200-0400	19	95
0400-0600	14	41
0600-0800	1	47
0800-1000	12	112
1000-1200	33	186
1200-1400	24	148
1400-1600	19	223
1600-1800	15	216
1800-2000	9	110
2000-2200	6	84
2200-2400	11	86
Total	166	1300

(2) Miscellaneous

	KIA	WIA
S&D	76	658
Defense	32	133
Convoy	3	10
Patrol	18	242
Base Area	8	62
In Flight	2	12
Ambush	1	6
Admin Mvmnt	4	12
Attack	-	14
Other	22	223
Leg	8	531
Arm	5	276
Head	41	185
Chest	27	40
Back	4	87
Stomach	7	26
Other	74	235
O-6	-	-
O-5	1	2
O-4	1	3
O-3	3	16
O-2	4	24
O-1	10	42
E-9	-	3
E-8	-	7
E-7	4	23
E-6	10	111
E-5	8	70
E-4	62	529
E-3	62	526
E-2	1	10
E-1	-	3

d. Since arrival in Vietnam the division has received 2,868 enlisted and 69 officer replacements.

5. (C) Intelligence

a. Enemy main force units in the division TAOR/AO have avoided contact with division elements with only small scale sporadic encounters recorded. The large scale battle fought during Operation ENTERPRISE was friendly initiated. The only large scale battle recorded that was enemy initiated occurred outside the division TAOR while the 1st Brigade was under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

b. Enemy losses to friendly operations during the reporting period were as follows:

	Feb	Mar	Apr
KIA	66	471	751
PW	13	20	61
Detainees	231	934	702
Small arms	11/0	83/0	1/1
Crew served weapons	0/0	1/0	1/1
Ammunition (rounds)	1848/35	3976/906	60132/5448
Grain (tons)	14.13/2.88	493.65/13.68	143.75/8.03
Sampans	5/11	9/85	12/103

NOTE: Captured/Destroyed

c. It is estimated that enemy combat strength in the division TAOR/AO is approximately 9,000 while strength of VC personnel assigned as members of irregular guerilla units, or to administrative and political tasks was estimated to be approximately 28,000. The following is a list of VC units in the TAOR/AO:

(1) Regiments

274 (Base Area 303, Bien Hoa, subordinate to the 5th VC Division)
Dong Thap I (Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa)
Dong Thap I (Dinh Tuong, Long An)

(2) Battalions

Dong Nai (Bien Hoa)
506th Bn (Long An)
2d Ind Bn (Long An)
514th Bn (Dinh Tuong)
516th Bn (Kien Hoa)
518th Bn (Kien Hoa)

(3) Companies

C240 (Long An)
C312 (Long An)
C314 (Long An)
C315 (Long An)
C316 (Long An)
C212 (Dinh Tuong)
Cho Go (Dinh Tuong)
Chau Thanh (Dinh Tuong)
Dong Hoa (Dinh Tuong)
C207 (Dinh Tuong)
Cai Lay (Dinh Tuong)
Cai Be (Dinh Tuong)
C530 (Kien Hoa)
C540 (Kien Hoa)
C550 (Kien Hoa

C560 (Kien Hoa)
C570 (Kien Hoa)
C580 (Kien Hoa)
C590 (Kien Hoa)

d. During the three month reporting period, there have been many reports of ARVN and Regular Force installations being attacked by VC throughout the division TAOR/AO. It is believed that this may be an effort to discourage the Vietnamese from supporting US Forces in the counterinsurgency effort. The number of attacks, acts of terrorism, hamlet entry, propaganda and sabotage incidents during the reporting period are shown below:

	Feb	Mar	Apr
Attacks	5	12	11
Terrorism	12	10	6
Hamlet Entry and Propaganda	9	-	2
Sabotage	1	1	3

e. Significant sources of intelligence has included the use of prisoners and Chieu Hois. Much useful information concerning VC organization and operations has been obtained from documents. Red Haze, SLAR, SPAR and agent reports have been considered useful in fixing enemy locations and activities. However, unless intelligence information has pertained to fixed targets it usually has been received too late to react. For example, on 12 April an aerial photographic mission was flown over the RUNG SAT Special Zone. It was a priority three mission and the results were not received until one week later. The photographs showed a large flotilla of sampans of varying lenghts being unloaded along the river banks. A subsequent visual inspection and later a ground search of the area revealed no indication of enemy activity. This is one of the many examples of information received too late for decisive action.

f. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and possible courses of action for the reporting period:

(1) The 5th VC Division (headquarters and support elements) and the 275 MF Regiment remained in the May Tao area. The 274 MF Regiment departed its customary area (Hat Dich) west of Highway 2 and its main elements apparently joined the remainder of the 5th VC Division in May Tao. The combat effectiveness of the 5th VC Division, particularly the 275 MF Regiment, was generally poor. Rice was in short supply and morale low because of the general lack of success by the 5th Division units and large caches of VC rice captured on Operation PORTSEA, 4-15 April 1967. 5th Division units avoided contact with US and Australian forces and attempted to improve their logistical situation by seizing rice and obtaining supplies from LOC's running through the Hat Dich area from RUNG SAT and Saigon.

(2) Bien Hoa Province: Local VC forces in Bien Hoa maintained the capability of lauching up to company size attacks. There were an estimated 1600 VC guerillas and members of district units in Bien Hoa while the 273 MF Regiment occasionally operated in the southeastern portion of Base Area 303. A VC combat group known as T-10, with a strength of approximately 1000 men, attempted to interdict shipping moving in and out of Saigon throughout the RUNG SAT Special Zone. VC forces in Bien Hoa were under considerable pressure and were mainly commited to counteracting the GVN Revolutionary Development Program.

(3) Long An Province: VC forces in or targeted against friendly installations in the Long An Province consisted of the 306th and 2d VC Battalions; and in addition to the 312th, 315th, and 316th district companies and approximately 20 village guerilla units. Enemy forces were able to recruit with facility and apparently replaced to a large extent their heavy battle and Chieu Hoi losses, to maintain unit strengths. However, the VC lost much freedom of action in the province due to constant search and destroy sweeps by the 9th Division and GVN Forces that kept VC forces off balance. The VC in Long

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An Province continued to avoid contact with division units and resorted to several harassing attacks of US installations with snipers and mortars. The enemy also staged several attacks against GVN outposts in an effort to destroy GVN influenece and discredit the Revolutionary Development Program.

(4) Dinh Tuong Province: VC forces consisted of the 261st and 263d MF Battalions, and the 514th LF Battalion. In addition, there were 6,780 guerillas. The VC tended to remain on the defensive except for harassing tactics which included use of booby traps, mines, and snipers.

6. (C) Operations

a. The 9th Infantry Division conducted 17 major and 2,343 small unit operations. Seventeen major and forty-seven small unit operations resulted in contact.

b. Operation SILVER LAKE (9-19 January), was a search and destroy operation conducted in the Binh Son rubber plantation area (YS 2193). The plantation had served as a major entry point for supplies, including twenty of the twenty-six tons of rice, destined for the 274th MF Regiment in the Phuoc Chi/Hat Dich Secret Zones. During its first operation, the 3d Brigade effectively denied the VC a significant source of tax revenue and a means of night movement of supplies by controlling vehicles on the plantation. Upon completion of the operation a battalion size security force was employed vicinity Binh Son until 24 February. Following withdrawal of the last battalion the plantation was patrolled by forces from Camp Martin Cox on an almost daily frequency. (App 11, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SILVER LAKE).

c. The first operation conducted by the 1st Brigade was operation COLBY (20-28 January). The 5-60 Inf (M) and the 3-5 Cav (-) participated under operational control of the brigade. This was an encirclement and search operation vicinity (YS 3088) in the Phuoc Chi Secret Zone and an area to the east, designed to destroy VC installations and supplies and inflict as many casualties as possible. In addition, to significant damage to VC base camps, training sites and medical installations, the VC were badly disorganized during withdrawal to avoid contact. Destruction of facilities during COLBY undoubtedly produced a long term adverse effect on Viet Cong activities in this area. Results of this operation are included in enemy losses for Operation COLBY/IOLA (App 12, Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation COLBY/IOLA)..

d. Operation IOLA was initiated on 28 January by the 1st Brigade immediately upon termination of Operation COLBY. Forces under operational control of the 1st Brigade included 3-5 Cav and 3-11 ACR. This operation was designed to secure Highway 15 during arrival and movement of the 2d Brigade and division rear elements from Vung Tau to Long Thanh North (Camp Martin Cox). The operation was highly successful in that closure of these elements marked the closing of the division without incident. (App 12, Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation COLBY/IOLA).

e. TF TRUSCOTT was formed on 28 January by 5-60 Inf (M). Initially the 5-60 Inf (M) with 2-60 Inf conducted operations vicinity the Binh Son rubber plantation in support of Operation IOLA. At 311500 January TF TRUSCOTT assumed OPCON of 3-5 Cav, 3-11 ACR and responsibility for security of Highway 15 from the 1st Brigade. TF TRUSCOTT then secured Highway 15 during movement of cargo from Vung Tau to Long Thanh North (Camp Martin Cox) until 5 February.

f. Operation PALM BEACH (28 January-30 April) was initiated by Headquarters, 3d Brigade at Dong Tam near My Tho (XS 5045). The 3-60 Inf and two engineer companies began deploying to Dong Tam (XS 415435) on 24 January. The mission of this task force was to begin development of the base and secure construction sites in preparation for arrival of additional elements of the division. Company size search and destroy operations were conducted in the local area and development of the base proceeded on schedule.. The 5-60 Inf (M) entered the Dinh Tuong Province on 4 February to secure the Binh Duc airstrip (XS 4845). The first major action occurred on 7 March when a platoon of 3-60

Inf engaged 80-100 VC north of Dong Tam while prepositioning forces for another operation (App 13, Final After Action Report on Operation NIGHT WALK). The following night the base received 60-80, 81-82mm mortar rounds resulting in 2 US KIA, and 10 US WIA. One hundred and twenty rounds of countermortar was returned with unknown results. On 10 March Headquarters, 2d Brigade replaced Headquarters 3d Brigade and 5-60 Inf (M) moved from the airstrip to Dong Tam base. The 5-60 Inf (M) (-C Co) moved to Operation ENTERPRISE on 20 March after being relieved by the 3-47 Inf. C Companies of the 3d and 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry were cross attached when 5-60 Inf (M) departed Dong Tam. Security of dredging facilities and local search and destroy operations continued through the end of the reporting period. Enemy losses thus far have been: 227 VC KIA (BC), 48 VC PW, 5 Chieu Hoi, and 34 small arms, 4 tons of rice captured.

g. The 1st Brigade (with 3-39 Inf and 4-39 Inf) participated in Operation BIG SPRING (1-15 February), under operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 3-39 Inf was withdrawn on 5 February in preparation for deployment to Long An Province and Operation ENTERPRISE. Light contact was reported during the operation. (App 14, Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation BIG SPRING (4-39)).

h. The initial operation conducted by Headquarters, 2d Brigade was Operation GREENLEAF (6-24 February). A brigade CP was established vicinity YS 115883 and 2-39 Inf, 2-47 Inf (M), 3-47 Inf and 3-5 Cav were deployed from Ap Binh Son (YS 2193) west across Highway 15 along the southern portion of the Nhon Trach District to vicinity YS 092814. Elements remained in static locations during the TET holiday truce (8-12 February) to check VC repositioning of personnel and supplies. Search and destroy operations conducted in the Nhon Trach area following the truce resulted in light contact. Results of the operation were 3 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh, 1 Springfield .03 rifle and miscellaneous items captured. (App 15, Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation GREENLEAF).

i. Operation UNIONTOWN (8 February-18 April). The 2-60 Inf was employed to secure and defend US bases at Bien Hoa, Long Binh Post and the relay site at Nui Chua Chan. The 2-60 Inf was relieved by 2-39 Inf on 24 February and the 2-39 Inf was relieved by the 4-39 Inf on 30 March. Light VC contact was reported.

j. Operation TUSCON (11-19 February) involved participation by 3-5 Cavalry under operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. (App 16, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation TUSCON).

k. Operation ENTERPRISE (13 February-30 April) has been a higly successful pacification operation in the Long An Province. Based on a plan prepared by the 1st Brigade for deployment of division units, the 3-39 Inf was the first unit to move into the province, relieving 2-14 Inf, 25th Infantry Division at Rach Kien (XS 7469) on 13 February. On 25 February 2-60 Inf moved into Ben Luc (XS 6276) while base camp facilities were being developed for the battalion at Tan Tru (XS 6265). On 8 March Position PIKE (XS 624725), an ARVN outpost manned by two reinforced ARVN platoons and an 81mm mortar squad from the 3-39 Inf, was attacked by an estimated VC company. The fifty minute attack resulted in 5 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 8 ARVN KIA and 8 ARVN WIA. On 10 March several movements affecting both operation ENTERPRISE and PALM BEACH took place. A division forward CP was established at Ben Luc (XS 6276), 2-60 Inf moved to Tan Tru and Headquarters, 3d Brigade established a brigade CP vicinity Tan An (XS 5464). On 20 March Position PIKE was again attacked by a company size VC force. Immediately prior to the attack ARVN forces had been relieved by the company headquarters and two rifle platoons of A/3-39 Inf. Results of the second encounter were 10 US KIA, 26 US WIA, and 55 VC KIA (BC). On 21 March 5-60 Inf (M) displaced from Dong Tam to Binh Phuoc (XS 6155). The most significant battle in the division area of operations occurred on 9 April vicinity Doi Ma Creek. Major elements of the 506 VC Provincial Mobile Battalion were discoverd in positions along the creek on the morning of 9 April by a forward air controller controlling a preplanned airstrike. The ensuing two

and a half day battle resulted in 247 VC KIA (BC), 1 PW and 42 small arms captured. (App 17, Combat Operations After Action Report, BATTLE OF DOI MA CREEK). Extensive search and destroy and pacification operations continued through the end of the reporting period. VC losses thus far are: 816 KIA (BC) 27 PW, 24 Chieu Hoi and 141 tons of rice, 1 81mm mortar and 67 small arms captured. US losses have been 74 KIA, 380 WIA and 2 APC destroyed.

l. Operation CHAPMAN (16 February-30 April) was initiated by 3-47 Inf in the RUNG SAT Special Zone. A battalion CP was established vicinity XS 010701. Two companies were employed on search and destroy operations throughout the southern portion of the zone on a rotating basis to preclude VC interdiction of the main shipping channel between the South China Sea and Saigon. The 3-47 Inf was relieved by 4-47 Inf on 17 March. (App 18, After Action Report, RIVER RAIDER I).

m. Operation SUITLAND (21 -28 February) included participation by 3-5 Cavalry under operational control of 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. (App 19, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SUITLAND).

n. Operation PITTSBURG (25 February-3 March) was a highly successful reconnaissance in force operation conducted by the 1st Brigade. The 2-47 Inf (M), 4-39 Inf and one airmobile company allocated on a daily basis, were employed to reconnoiter the southern portion of War Zone D during the latter phase of Operation BIG SPRING. Although only light contact was made, elements of the 7th VC Division were denied freedom of movement out of the zone. (App 20, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PITTSBURG).

o. Operation FAIRFAX (1 March-30 April) was conducted by 199th Brigade (Sep) (Light) in the Gia Dinh Province under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division.

p. Operation JUNCTION CITY (3-29 March), Headquarters, 1st Brigade with 4-39 Inf, 2-47 Inf (M) and 3-5 Cav participated in Operation JUNCTION CITY under OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. On 20 March A Troop, 3-5 Cav was attacked by major elements of the 273d VC Regiment vicinity Bau Bang (XT 788458), while providing security for an artillery fire support base. During the attack 87 air sorties were flown and over 2900 rounds of artillery were fired. Results were 231 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC PW, 3 US KIA and 26 USWIA. (App 21, Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation JUNCTION CITY).

q. Operation PORTSEA (Phase II) (3-15 April) was conducted by the 1st Brigade in cooperation with the 1st ATF and one squadron of the 11th ACR. Headquarters, 1st Brigade (with 2-39 Inf, 2-47 Inf (M), and 3-5 Cav) was employed to disrupt the logistical supply system of the 5th VC Division, extend GVN influence, and destroy VC forces where found along Route 327 from Binh Gia (YS 5077) to Xuyen Moc (XS 6568). This operation forced the enemy to reposition forces throughout the province to avoid significant contact. Results of the operation were: 44 VC KIA (BC), 6 VCPW, 77 weapons, 219,163 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 18 tons of rice captured. (App 22, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PORTSEA).

r. Operation JUNCTION CITY (Phase III) (19 April0 continuing) is being conducted by Headquarters 1st Brigade with 4-39 Inf and 2-47 Inf (M) under OPCON of the 25th Infantry Division in the Tay Ninh Province.

7. (FOUO) Training

a. The initial problem of training the division after activation was a lack of sufficient qualified and experienced cadre. Although this trend continued through deployment, it was resolved initially by conducting approximately one-half of BCT by committee rather that unit training. As units entered AIT, training was conducted at unit level. The Army approved period of sixteen weeks was used to conduct BCT and AIT. To meet proposed deployment schedules the provisiions of USCONARC Circular 350-33, Subject; Guidance for Training Newly Activated Units, permitted units to complete the unit training phase (normally thirteen weeks) in eight weeks (App2, Phases of Training).

b. MOS training was facilitated by on post training of 1,423 personnel. The Fort Riley Post Education Center, NCO Academy, Fort Riley STRAF and CONUS operating units and OJT were used to provide on post MOS training. In addition, approximately 2,144 personnel were sent to off post schools for MOS qualification training. The major problem in providing candidates for training in highly technical skills (medical and electronic) was the availability of personnel with requisite background experience to qualify them for attendance.

c. Training for riverine operations conducted at Fort Riley consisted of limited dry net, water safety, plastic assault boat, and waterproofing training. Technical assistance for this training was provided by the Naval Amphibious Center, Coronado, California. Approximately forty division personnel attended an eleven day course of instruction on riverine operations at the Coronado Center prior to deployment to RVN.

d. Shipboard training enroute to RVN consisted of a reemphasis of general subjects, Vietnamese language courses, and care and cleaning of the M16E1 rifle which was issued just prior to the division's departure.

e. A division replacement center was organized in January 1967. New replacements currently receive approximatel forty hours of intensive training prior to further assignment within the division.

f. Specialized training in Vietnam has been conducted on several subjects. The MACV RECONDO School has been used to train the nucleus of the LRRP Detachment. Army and Colt representatives presented an eight hour class on the XM148 grenade launcher to selected division personnel during February 1967. In March a mortar crew testing program was initiated to facilitate increasing the accuracy and reaction time of gun crews. Also, a mobile training team was organized by the 15th Engineer Battalion to present three hour blocks of instruction on mines and booby traps to outlying units.

g. Standards of training within the division have remained excellent through the reporting period.

8. (U) Chemical Activities

a. Defoliation Operations

(1) During the month of January the chemical section initiated defoliation operations along the north and east side of Camp Martin Cox. A helicopter mounted spray apparatus consisting of a 10 foot length of pipe with ¼" holes drilled every six inches, mounted across the aircraft skids was used. A fifty-five gallon drum filled with herbicide inside the helicopter was connected to the pipe by a one inch diameter rubber hose. The drum was slightly pressurized with a 3½cfm compressor to force the solution into the spray bar. A hand pump was used to refill the drum after a spray of five minutes. This method is satisfactory for small areas unaccessible by ground vehicle however, in thick jungle areas only the top layer of the canopy was affected. Against grass and brush the agent was considered successful.

(2) During February 10,000 gallons of herbicide was dispensed from a power decontaminating apparatus mounted on a 2½ ton truck. This method of delivery was hampered on several occasions when equipment was damaged by stumps, logs, etc., hidden by foliage.

(3) During April perimeter defoliation was performed at Rach Kien (XS 740696) and Tan Tru (XS 655621). The defoliation solution was sprayed using Mitey-Mites and portable flamethrowers. Both methods were suitable however, the Mitey-Mite proved a more effective range dispenser for ground defoliation.

b. Riot Control Agents (RCA)

Several RCA operations were connected during the period using

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a variety of delivery methods. On one occasion ninety barrels of RCA CS-1 fitted with bursters were dropped from 3200 feet and exploded at tree top level. Ground contamination was accomplished however, prevailing winds carried some agent forty kilometers downwind. Powdered CS was employed with success in tunnel denial operations particularly in support of Operation COLBY.

9. (FOUO) Logistics

a. Supply and Services

(1) During the reporting period supply and service operations within the division were established and improved. The division relied mainly upon organic support for all operations but received excellent support from 1st Logistical Command when needed. Listed below are resumes of logistical support activities.

(a) Operation PALM BEACH: Operations from Dong Tam base are being supplied from a division forward supply element which receives supplies from the 53rd General Support Group, Vung Tau, RVN, through the Dong Tam Logistical Support Area established by 1st Logistical Command. All classes of supply are being delivered by barge, LST, or aircraft to the base.

(b) Operation ENTERPRISE: When the division undertook Operation ENTERPRISE, several logistical problems became apparent. One of the major problems being the obtaining of fresh water from a well source in Tan An. The area of operations for ENTERPRISE is inside the salt water intrusion line, therfore, rendering surface water unfit for consumption. To solve this problem two actions were required. The first was to contract for purchase of water from a well at Tan An. This was accomplished by contract prepared by 1st Logistical Command. Water is now purchased for about five cents a cubic meter. Approximately 12,000 gallons a day are used. Secondly, a source was needed to transport water in large quantities to the battalions in the field other than their organic water trailers. The division requested temporary loan of water tankers from 1st Logistical Command and received three 1000 gallon and one 5000 gallon tanker. Another major problem was acquiring sufficient land (five acres) to establish a division forward supply element. This was accomplished by upgrading and expanding an airstrip west of Tan An to accommodate the FSE as well as providing a C-123 capable airstrip. Class I and III are delivered to the FSE by 1st Logistical Command and Class V is received through Dong Tam.

(c) Operation CHAPMAN: The infantry battalion conducting Operation CHAPMAN in the RUNG SAT Special Zone is supplied from Camp Martin Cox by air and from Vung Tau by LOC. Both methods have proven satisfactory.

(2) Upon arrival in RVN basic loads of ammunition were filled by receiving ammunition at the available supply rate (ASR). Because initial ammunition expenditures were light, the first units to arrive were able to rapidly establish basic loads for the arrival of subsequent units. This procedure was followed until all basic loads were established.

(3) The two major areas of concern in supply have been the shortage of TA 50-901 and communication equipment. A shortage of bulk storage reefers resulted in spoilage of forced issues of perishables because of storage limitations.

b. Maintenance

(1) Along with forward supply sections, maintenance companies have been positioned at Dong Tam, Ben Luc, and with the 1st Brigade to provide support maintenance for division units.

(2) The division deadline rate has fluctuated between approximately 450-600 items. Signal items constitute about 80% of the total deadline with engineer and wheeled vehicles accounting for the majority of the remaining 20%. An increase in aircraft deadline occirred when the 90 day

stockage of PLL with which the aviation battalion deployed, was depleted. Deadline rates can be attributed to dust, heat and continued combat operations.

(3) The 709th MaintenanceBattalion had the following number of job orders received and completed during the reporting period:

	Received	Completed
Heavy construction equip	43	34
Wheeled vehicles	521	534
Tracked vehicles	123	109
Generators	382	375
Signal equipment	3982	2922
Aircraft	270	279
Artillery and mortar	80	79

(4) Medical. The 9th Medical Battalion treated 2,054 patients from the division and 238 non-divisional patients during the reporting period, of these 1,380 were wounded in action. During the same period MEDCAP treated 18,277 patients and DENTCAP treated 553 patients.

(5) Graves Registration. The graves registration section of the 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion processed 131 remains and 169 personal effects. Of the remains 3 were non-divisional.

10 (U) Civic Action and Psychological Operations

a. Civic Action

(1) Area Coordinating Committees have been established throughout the division's AO. At present, three ACC'S are at province level and three at district level. These committees are composed of VN-US personnel. Area Coordinating Committee functions deal with both military operations and military/civic affairs problems encountered in an area. It acts as an instrument for the coordination, planning and execution of all combined operations within its jurisdiction. Progress has been made in the following areas:

(a) Support for RD/IF outpost.

(b) Security for Revolutionary Development activities and work.

(c) Combined planning and operations.

(d) Reporting on incidents between US and VN personnel.

(e) Civic Action programs.

(f) More Community Relations Committees being established.

(g) Subcommittees such as youth and self-help committees being programmed.

(h) The ACC has proven itself to be valuable in solving common problems and keeping both US and GVN informed of what the other is doing and methods of reinforcement.

(2) Civic action projects, must be conducted one at a time, at any one location, otherwise no activity will achieve the results desired. For example, holding a MEDCAP and food distribution to needy people at the same time give doctors only a small number of people to treat.

(3) Constant command emphasis is being placed on civic action projects to preclude assigning a low priority to CA activities for the more urgent demands of the tactical situation.

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(4) Other units have paid skilled Vietnamese laborers for civic action projects. The division is refusing to do this in order to make the Vietnamese officials and civilians work toward becoming responsible citizens.

(5) The 9th Division has helped refugees in the village of An Nhut Tan move back into their village by providing technical assistance, labor equipment and material. The market place, school, dispensaries and roads are being repaired and returned to operating condition. Needy people arerceceiving foodstuffs and clothing.

(6) Civic Action projects in hamlets having RD teams present were designed to fill in, and complement RD team work. If an RD team required assistance by heavy equipment, every effort has been made to make it available. Several of these requests were filled by a bulldozer provided by division engineers.

(7) RD team security has been assigned to commanders as part of their mission. This is to insure that the RD teams are afforded an ample opportunity to perform their mission.

(8) Specific goals have been assigned in the area of MEDCAPS. MEDCAPS are conducted at the rate of one perday per battalion or larger size unit having a surgeon in its headquarters. Schedules provide for more effective utilization of medical personnel. A schedule insures that all doctors are used on a regular basis, rather than indiscreminately using a few doctors all the time and some doctors not at all.

b. Psychological Operations

(1) Since arrival in Vietnam, the Division PSYOPS campaign has increased in effectiveness and volume to support division operations. PSYOPs has been employed in every major division operation during the reporting period. The increase in both volume and effectiveness can be attributed to the experience gained by division PSYOPs personnel and the increased support rendered by the 246th PSYOPs Company. There has also been an increased awareness on the part of the key commanders within the division on the importance of PSYOPs. Themes have been directed in support of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program and aimed at separating VC from the population. Emphasis is being placed on rapid reaction PSYOPs to exploit Hoi Chanh and tactical successes. Rapid reaction PSYOPs has contributed immeasurably to the marked increase of Hoi Chanhs rallying to FWMAF. The non-availability of authorized equipment has however, severely limited unitrapid reaction PSYOPs capability and effectiveness.

(2) During the reporting period, PSYOPs activities were directed mainly in support of Operations UNIONTOWN, GREENLEAF, CHAPMAN, PITTSBURG, JUNCTION CITY, PORTSEA II, FAIRFAX, ENTERPRISE, and Operation PALM BEACH. Leaflet drops and/or handouts were made daily during the reporting period. A total of 21,911,000 leaflets were distributed throughout the division areas of operation. These were supplied by the supporting PSYOPs Company. In addition, to air leaflet missions, there were a total of 70,439 JUSPAO newsletters posters,and miscellaneous publications hand distributed. Distribution by hand is made to bring to the forefront the proven PSYOPs technique of "Face to Face Persuasion". This technique will be stressed in future operations. A total of one hundred hours of ground and aerial loudspeaker support was provided in support of MED/DENTCAPS and division operations to complement leaflet drops. Movies shown by the mobile PSYOPs team have become an effective propaganda means and very popular with the target audience. For the period 1 February to 30 April, 82 movies were shown with an average attendance of 183. Films consisted of comedies, westerns, public health and VN psychological appeals. A total of 33 Hoi Chanhs rallied to division units and 1608 rallied to GVN forces in provinces where division units have been operating during the reporting period. In the Long An Province, this represents an increase of 628 over the number of Hoi Chanhs recorded during the same period in 1966.

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11. (C) Internal Security

a. Each base camp area occupied by division elements is contained within a perimeter or berm. Each perimeter/berm consists of a series of bunkers, fully manned during darkness or periods of reduced visibility and covered by observation during daylight. Patrols are circulated outside perimeters/berms to provide security or established ambushes. Helicopters are maintained on airstrip alert at key installations to provide observation for countermortar fire and gunship support.

b. Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat)

(1) The mission for security and defense of Camp Martin Cox was initially delegated to division artillery. A base security CP was established at Headquarters, 9th Division Artillery. The security CP coordinated defense of the berm and conduct of local patrols (out to 4000 meters) with forces allocated from tactical and tenant units at Camp Martin Cox. Fire support was provided by elements of division artillery on a twenty-four hour basis. Area responsibilities and mission requirements were coordinated with a US Special Forces Camp located adjacent to Camp Martin Cox.

(2) The security CP was organized with one base security officer (FSO), three assistant DO's, three NCO's and three RTO/drivers. The berm was divided into four sectors, each sector had a CP composed of one sector duty officer, an assistant duty officer, three NCO's, three RTO/drivers and a proportionate share of the eighty six bunkers which constitute the berm.

(3) The minimum number of personnel and weapons reuired for security are:

Personnel	274	MG, cal.50	3
SB-22 (Switchboard)	9	XM148/M79	23
TA-312 (telephone)	101	M42 (twin 40)	2
M16E1	201	M55 (quad 50)	2
M60	26	Searchlights	2
Pistol, cal .45	20		

(4) On 3 March 1967 responsibility for security of Camp Martin Cox was extended to include the entire (Bearcat) tactical area of responsibility.

(5) A provisional detachment was organized on 1 April to assume responsibilities for base camp security of Camp Martin Cox. The detachment is called TF Forsyth. The TF mission is to command and control combat combat support and combat support elements during conduct of operations within the TAOR associated with Camp Martin Cox to include perimeter defense.

c. Dong Tam Base.

(1) The security and defense of Dong Tam to include construction and dredging equipment is the responsibility of the commanding officer, 2d Brigade. The perimeter is divided into five sectors (four land and one water) with each tactical and tenant unit assigned a sector. The principle means of defense are bunkers, fire and light towers and obstacles.

(2) One innovation used at Dong Tam which has proven highly successful is construction of portable bunkers. Due to the rapid expansion of the base, construction of permanent bunkers was not practical. Portable bunkers were constructed of timber 6" x 6" x RL and mounted on skids. As the perimeter is expanded sandbags are removed and the bunkers are towed to new positions by a dozer. Once bunkers are in position they are resandbagged.

d. Each of the other base areas are organized for defense in the same manner as Dong Tam and Camp Martin Cox. The senior tactical commander at outlying base areas is charged with responsibility for security and defense of these bases.

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12. (U) Base Development

a. Camp Martin Cox

(1) Base Development started at Camp Martin Cox with arrival of the 15th Engineer Battalion on 20 October 1966. At that time Camp Martin Cox consisted of a cleared area 887 x 1992 meters or approximately 441 acres. The battalion's mission was to expand the camp to support division main, two infantry brigades and necessary support units. The 15th Engineer Battalion effort was to have been supplemented by the 35th Engineer Battalion in November 1966, however, support of the engineer battalion was withdrawn prior to its arrival. The resulting loss of approximately 203 line company days caused the 15th Engineer Battalion to work 24 hours a day in order to accomplish its mission. By 31 January 1967, the battalion had constructed 44,315 feet of road using approximately 110,648 cubic yards of laterite, completed associated drainage, prefabricated 97 latexines, 89 showers, 67 mess hall frames and poured concrete pads for each of the prefabricated buildings. In addition, the battalion cleared approximately 1470 acres of unsecured jungle. Vertical construction was facilitated by arrival of the 169th Engineer Construction Battalion in February 1967. At the close of the reporting period Camp Martin Cox is approximately 1355 x 2754 meters or 1,070 acres (App 28, Camp Martin Cox).

b. Dong Tam Base

(1) On 21 November 1966 COMUSMACV directed that a feasibility study be made to determined if one infantry battalion could be deployed to Dong Tam in January 1967 and a brigade in February. The construction (fill) of Dong Tam was progressing on schedule. However, no vertical construction had been started. Once again loss of the 35th Engineer Battalion impacted on the base development effort as approximately 95 company days were lost.

(2) Reasons for selection of the site for Dong Tam were:

(a) The site was near the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone boundary which facilitated coordination of operations.

(b) Sand was readily available that could be dredged to provide a required fill of 8'.

(c) The site was above the salt water intrusion line which would facilitate fresh water resupply. NOTE: The line reaches a point between My Tho and Dong Tam during the dry season before receding toward the South China Sea during the wet season.

(3) An engineer planning group for Dong Tam was formed on 28 December 1966. This planning group subsequently became a task force command and control group and was expanded from an OIC (S3, 15th Engineer Battalion) and NCOIC to include an operations/survey officer, operations NCO, two recon NCO's, a draftsman, two surveyors, a clerk typist, and supply and water point personnel. By 9 January 1967, the planning group had completed scheduling transportation for equipment and troops, requisitioning construction materials and coordinating with logistical, security, advisor and ARVN personnel to support phased development of the base. B and C Companies, 15th Engineer Battalion arrived at Dong Tam on 10 January 1967 and began construction of perimeter defense bunkers, mortar shelters, boat and barge landing sites, showers, laterines, roads, and drainage structures. At the end of the reporting period 300 of the programmed 600 acre site had been completed. (App 27, Dong Tam Base).

13. (C) Fire Support

a. Artillery

(1) Upon arrival in Vietnam, each artillery battalion supported base camp security from Camp Martin Cox (YS 1600). Fire missions

included support of local patrols, tactical operations, ARVN Advisors and harassment and interdiction fires. On 10 January 3-34 Arty displaced from Camp Martin Cox to support Operation SILVER LAKE. Following support of this operation the 3-34 Arty deployed to Dong Tam where it became operational on 27 January. During January there were no major changes in artillery organization for combat. Seven thousand-eight hundred thirty-three rounds of artillery were expended during 896 missions fired during the month.

(2) The 1-84 Arty (155/8") arrived and became operational from Camp Martin Cox on 5 February 1967. Division Artillery continued to support tactical operations during the month from Camp Martin Cox, Dong Tam, the RUNG SAT Special Zone, the division TAOR and 1-11 Arty accompanied the 1st Brigade on Operations BIG SPRING and PITTSBURG. Due to the lack of available land lines of communication in the Dinh Tuong Province (Dong Tam area), the 3-34 Arty developed a method of providing artillery support from a Navy barge. Two howitzers were mounted on each barge (App 24, Photograph). The barge is approximately 30' x 90' and is maneuvered by an LCM-8 (boat). The barge provides sufficient space for storage of ammunition and limited troop living space. A fire direction center is mounted in the LCM-8. The following observations were noted:

(a) Aerial and map reconnaissance are inadequate for determining firing positions. Reconnaissance must be made by boat.

(b) Careful consideration of tide conditions must be made to insure that barge will not be grounded when the tide is out.

(c) Movement against tides is very difficult.

(d) Night vision devices proved to be very effective. Infrared searchlights simplify navigation and permit constant surveillence of river banks.

(e) Direct fire on beaches prior to landing troops instills confidence, reduces landing defenses and has a tremendous shock value on enemy troops.

(f) Proper application of MET and VE techniques in maintaining GFT settings provides accurate fire without conducting daily registrations.

(3) During March the effectiveness of harassment and interdiction fires (H&I) was realized when a Hoi Chanh surrendered to ARVN in the Dinh Tuong Province. The Hoi Chanh explained that he and a fellow VC took precautions to rest under overhead cover but even then they were still suffering casualties from H&I fires from Dong Tam. Two major changes were made in artillery organization for combat during the month. The mission of 2-4 Arty was changed from DS 2d Brigade to DS 3d Brigade and the 3-34 Arty DS mission from 3d Brigade to 2d Brigade.

(4) Division Artillery continued to support division operations during the month, On 1 April B/1-84 Arty successfully fired an 8" M-110 self propelled howitzer from a De Long work barge. During April division artillery submitted a request for issue of an additional AN/TPS-25 radar set. The one set authorized had been employed from a sixty foot tower at Dong Tam in support of Operation PALM BEACH. During the period the set had been in operation it had detected over 200 targets in the Dong Tam area. Seventy-four of the targets were in free fire areas or in areas where ARVN granted permission to fire. The set has proved unusually successful in the flat areas of the Delta. Upon receipt of another AN/TPS-25 it will be employed from Tan An in support of Operation ENTERPRISE.

(5) During the period 1 February-30 April, units of Division Artillery fired 30,007 missions and expended 165,700 rounds.

b. Tactical air support flew 1,467 sorties delivering 1,802 tons of bombs and 523 tons of napalm.

AVDE-PH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. (C) Observation

(a) (FOUO) Personnel

ITEM: Deployability Criteria

DISCUSSION: Policies, procedures, and criteria governing individual deployability criteria are contained in DA Circular 614-8. This criteria originally applied to personnel in the division. On 19 September 1966, after the division was well into its unit training phase, there had been 21 modified conditions of non-deployability imposed on the division causing a loss of 2,284 personnel. The net effect of not having firm deployability criteria at the outset caused the following problems:

1. NCO's who had trained with and knew their men, were reassigned to non deploying units prior to deployment. This required the reassignment of deploying NCO's from units marginally affected to those affected the heaviest. It also necessitated the assignment of lower grade, lesser skilled personnel to positions of leadership.

2. Considerable strength accounting turbulance was created when many of the non deployable personnel were assigned to non divisional units and others remained assigned to the division. In some cases personnel were reassigned from the division and attached back for duty. This coupled with mass internal adjustments caused by filler assignments created morning report errors, rendered unit rosters obsolete even before they were published, and made it extremely difficult to account for enlisted promotion vacancies.

3. In certain cases the inherent vagueness of the non deployability criteria permitted a few personnel to avoid deployment yet they later were declared deployable when the criteria was further defined. This also added to the strength accounting turbulence and caused a hardship on those who had to reconsider relocating their families.

4. The personnel records in a ROAD division are centrally maintained in division headquarters. Each time the deployability criteria was modified, it required a 100% records check to determine those who were affected by the criteria change. This could not be done mechanically as many of the conditions were not listed in established ADP files. Since those no longer eligible for deployment had to be identified immediately, it required the concentrated resources of the entire Personnel Services Division to review records in a crash basis.

5. Once non deployable personnel were identified, they often were reported for reassignment to either the Post, Army Headquarters, CONUSAC, or DA, depending on the requirements for personnel and the MOS of those declared non deployable. Sufficient time was rarely given for units to release, clear, and ship them in an orderly manner.

6. The 21 conditions modifying deployability criteria were specified and covered in almost as many regulations, circulars and messages. This promoted rumors at various times and unnecessary requirements to interpret the provisions of the publications to newly assigned personnel at unit level who were unfamiliar with them or had only been advised of part of them.

7. Other CONUS units levied for personnel for assignment to the division were often unaware of the deployability criteria and consequently the inadvertantly assigned more non deployables to the division.

OBSERVATION: It is essential that the deployability criteria for a unit be established at the outset and that this criteria remain firm throughout the activation and deployment of the unit.

ITEM: POM Processing

AVDE-EH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

DISCUSSION: AR 612-35 outlines in considerable detail the policies and procedures governing the mass processing of personnel in preparatory to movement overseas. In actual practice there are two basic methods of accomplishing this:

1. The non-divisional garrison personnel activity can provide the processing team to accomplish this task or,

2. The deploying unit can establish its own team made up of non deployable personnel.

- The task of POM processing an entire division is a monumental one that must be accomplished swiftly and in a manner that least disrupts unit training. Therefore, the latter of the two basic methods above is preferable for the following reasons:

1. The processing team is under complete control of the deploying unit and has immediate control of the personnel records.

2. Certain command training policies concerning indoctrination of personnel are normally published during activation. This indoctrination must be afforded to each deploying individual and certification of this made prior to the unit departure. A team under control of the unit can better establish a check on these certificates.

3. The division's medical, dental, supply and personnel facilities are immediately available to make on-the-spot adjustments should a need arise. Coordination is much easier when corrective action can be taken internally rather than relying on another headquarters that usually has other deploying units to administer to.

4. Once the team is operational, the members must be exempt from all details and completely free to process a unit at any hour of the day or night. This is not usually the case when the division must rely on a garrison team.

5. There will be instances when a unit will not be able to meet its scheduled processing date. Last minute schedule adjustments must be made. A division team can better react to sudden changes.

OBSERVATION: Experience indicates that a POM processing team directly under the control of a deploying unit is preferable to one established by the garrison activity.

ITEM: Records Shipment

DISCUSSION: Unless absolute controls are established, personnel records of non deployable personnel will be shipped and records of deploying will be left behind. The following measures are required to insure correct records disposition:

1. Records are referenced to unit personnel rosters 24 hours prior to unit departure.

2. Records are again checked as units board transportation on the day of departure.

3. Insofar as possible, personnel records accompany individuals on the same mode of transportation.

4. When surface travel is used, two personnel representatives per 450-man group are employed to update forms and process personnel actions to preclude an administrative backlog upon arrival.

OBSERVATION: It is imperative the maximum possible controls be employed during personnel records transfers.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDL-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

ITEM: Disposition of less than desireable personnel from a deploying unit:

DISCUSSION: Unfit and undesireable personnel must be identified and eliminated from the service as early as possible for the following reasons:

1. It can be expected that the press of training commitments will prevent commanders from taking the necessary steps to initiate elimination action until they have been made aware of how to do it and sufficient evidence is available to substantiate the action.

2. Unless these individuals are eliminated early, there is an unmanageable buildup just prior to deployment. This is at a time when the unit commanders can least afford to be diverted from his mission of preparing his unit for deployment. From a morale standpoint, it is not good personnel management to have unfit and undesireable personnel lingering in a unit until just prior to deployment.

3. If action is taken at the last minute, there will be instances when personnel are virtually pulled off convoys moving to the port of debarkation. Turbulence is caused in strength accounting if each of the units submitting morning reports depart CONUS carrying in its strength personnel who have not been eliminated from the service yet have remained behind.

OBSERVATION: It is in the interest of both morale and good personnel management to identify and process for elimination those personnel who are unfit or undesireable for retention in the service as far inadvance of unit deployment as possible.

ITEM: MOS Substitution

DISCUSSION: MOS substitutions are feasible providing time is available for retraining. MOS substitution from a more difficult to a less difficult skill is acceptable in most cases.

OBSERVATION: Currently authorized MOS substitutions from a less difficult to a more difficult skill should be reviewed.

ITEM: MOS Qualified Personnel

DISCUSSION: It is not practical for newly activated units to train personnel for hard-skill MOS's (requiring ten or more weeks training), from assigned resources. While the unit is engaged inother phases of training, these individuals are required to attend MOS qualifying schools, thereby negating their maximum utilization during training.

OBSERVATION: A portion of hard-skill requirements for newly activated units should be provided from school pipeline outputs without waiting to qualify newly assigned personnel in hard-skilled MOS's.

ITEM: Grade Substitutions

DISCUSSION: The authorized two grade substitution for grade E5 and below, operates to fill high density, hard skill MOS positions with all grade E3 or E4. For example, the mechanical maintenance section, Maintenance Battalion is authorized 48 automotive repairman (MOS 63H) with a grade spread as follows: E5 - 8, E4 - 32, and E3 - 8. Provisions for all 48 personnel as described resulted in an E3 - E4 grade spread without sufficient experienced personnel to supervise.

OBSERVATION: At least one of every four individuals authorized in areas as shown in the example should be assigned in the grade authorized.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-EH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

ITEM: Divisional Units are not Organized to Maintain Personnel Records

DISCUSSION: When it became apparent that the engineer battalion would deploy before the remainder of the division an attempt was made to augment the battalion with personnel management personnel. Of ten requested by the battalion, seven were provided. The battalion was then forced to provide additional clerks from its own resources.

OBSERVATION: That provisions be made to augment units operating away from its parent organization for an extended period of time (over 90 days) with sufficient personnel to support a personnel management activity.

ITEM: Deferred Arrival of Officer and Enlisted Cadre

DISCUSSION: When sufficient cadre are not available to organize all units simultaneously, units must be organized in priority of need. In the case of the division support command, the supply and transportation battalion had to be organized first to issue equipment and provide transportation for units conducting training. Consequently, maintenance support requirements emerged prior to the time the maintenance battalion could be organized to effectively cope with the problem.

OBSERVATION: Units should not be organized and assigned a mission until a reasonable number of cadre are available.

(b) (C) Operations

ITEM: Flexibility in Operations

DISCUSSION: Operations must be planned and conducted without benefit of hard intelligence in many cases. However, units at all levels must be prepared to abandon unremunerative operations on short notice and react to engage a more lucrative target.

OBSERVATION: Units must maintain flexibility to divert planned operations against lucrative targets produced by hard intelligence.

ITEM: Concurrent Planning

DISCUSSION: Upon initiation of an unsdheduled operation, numerous contingencies must be planned concurrent with operational planning. Fire support, reinforcement and extraction contingency planning must parallel operational planning in order to be able to react to any unforseen situation.

OBSERVATION: Upon initiation of an unscheduled operation, contingency plans must be formulated as maneuver elements are being committed to the objective area.

ITEM: Pursuit

DISCUSSION: After contact has been established, units must relentlessly pursue the enemy with aid of air, artillery and gunships. Brigade and higher units must be alert to shift resources needed for accomplishment of the pursuit. Air power and artillery are most effective when ground pressure has temporarily fixed a fleeing enemy in open terrain. Additionally, air power should be available, one strike following another, to prevent the enemy from taking cover or escaping.

OBSERVATION: When an operation appears to offer lucrative results, all required resources must be made available and rapidly shifted in pursuit.

AVDE-H
SUBJECT: Organizational Report - Lessons Learned (MCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

ITEM: Fire Support in the RUNG SAT Special Zone

DISCUSSION: Most operations conducted in the RSSZ will of necessity, be forced to operate outside supporting range of land based artillery. Response to immediate requests for TAC Air were delayed because requests had to be relayed through NHA BE to supporting DASC.

OBSERVATION: When operating in the RSSZ fire support depends primarily on fire power that can be delivered from supporting Naval craft.

ITEM: Embarking and Debarking LST's

DISCUSSION: Embarking and debarking LST's is time consuming, causes excessive wear and damage to equipment, and can present a fatique factor. The later is especially true if troops must operate in multiple objective areas during one day.

OBSERVATION: Time required to embark and debark LST's is reduced considerably by using the LST accomodation ladder and a pontoon.

ITEM: Equipment loads carried during dismounted operations in the Mekong Delta.

DISCUSSION: Extreme difficulty has been encountered when negotiating the numerous streams and waterways in the Delta. Unit movement is geared in direct proportion to individual load bearing capabilities. Operations during periods of good visibility when additional fire support i.e., air, artillery, rapid reaction forces, etc, are readily available, reduces equipment requirements considerably.

OBSERVATION: Small unit leaders must be very selective when defining equipment to be taken on operations. Certain items which are of little use during daylight, starlight scopes, mortars, anti-intrusion devices, claymore mines, M-49 trip flares, etc, can be delivered by air at the end of the day.

ITEM: Equipment carried by engineer troops on operations in RSSZ.

DISCUSSION: There are no roads, few trails and very little dry land in the RSSZ. Most of the time the troops are walking in mud. Streams must be crossed often. Troops cannot carry much equipment, yet they must be prepared to stay two to three days on each patrol.

OBSERVATION: Most of the engineer support required takes the form of booby trap removal or landing zone construction. Both jobs require demolitions. Chain saws are too bulky and heavy. Give each man five pounds of explosives, detonating cord, time fuze and blasting caps to blow booby traps.

ITEM: Booby Traps in RSSZ

DISCUSSION: The booby traps employed by the VC in the RSSZ are mostly made from grenades or claymore type mines. Very seldom are other explosive types found, although pungi traps are used. Booby traps are often set in an area the day after it has been cleared and used by American troops. Mine detectors are too big and bulky to useful in the RSSZ.

OBSERVATION: The best defense against booby traps is constant awareness and dispersion. Almost all booby traps could be seen. A few are placed under water in streams. All can be destroyed in place with TNT and should not be removed any other way if TNT is available. An area should be cleared, regardless of how recently it has been occupied.

AVDG-EH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

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ITEM: Water Tranportation in RSSZ

DISCUSSION: Streams are so numerous in the RSSZ that travel by water is a necessity even within a bivouac area.

OBSERVATION: The three-man inflatable boat can be carried easily on a rucksack frame. It should be considered essential to any patrol. The large 15 man assault boat should be considered for units larger than company size if they plan to stay any length of time in the RSSZ. These boats are useful for troop movement and resupply.

ITEM: Tunnel and bunker destruction

DISCUSSION: Many tunnels and bunkers with three to four foot overhead cover and reinforced with timber have been found during operations.

OBSERVATION: It has been observated from experience that the bangalore torpedo is the fastest and most effective for this type tunnel destruction. In contrast, for bunker destruction the 40 pound crating charge does a better job. The charge should be placed against the ceiling of the bunker or tunnel to achieve the best results.

ITEM: Helicopters are a critical commodity and their utilization must be carefully managed.

DISCUSSION: The UH-1D helicopter has proven its versatility in Vietnam as a command and control center, combat vehicle, and the preferred means of transportation. Due to the limited number of aircraft available to support the entire division their utilization must be carefully controled. The key to obtaining maximum support for the division is an awareness by all users of aircraft that for each hour flown six hours of maintenance are required. The aircraft must by necessity be at home station for the majority of this maintenance time. Users can take positive action to improve utilization of aircraft by scheduling missions only after considering the following points:

1. Is the mission an actual requirement and not simply a convience? Can it be accomplished by another means other than aircraft?

2. Can the requirement be answered by telephone or secure radio rather than personal contact?

3. In the event of a delay mission, does the requirement still exist?

4. When requesting resupply aircraft does the request cont in type load, number of sorties, flight time, and estimated total weight? Is the resupply load actually required or nice to have? Will the aircraft be required all day? If not specify specific time periods and another unit can utilize the aircraft.

5. If the mission request changes in number of passengers, number of sorties, times, etc, has the AME been notified?

6. Release the aircraft as soon as possible as the mission has been completed. Do not retain it on assumption or remote ossibilities since other units need support also. If an extension is requested, insure that a valid tactical requirement for the aircraft exists.

OBSERVATION: Request for helicopter support will receive every consideration in accordance with priorities established by Division G-3. Considerati n of the validity and necessity of a request and plans for proper utilization must be made to enable the division to receive maximum support.

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ITEM: Non-compliance with published SOI frequencies.

DISCUSSION: There are several documented cases of divisional units operating their command nets on frequencies other than those published in the effective item in the SOI. Such deviations from the assigned frequency is dangerous to communications security and causes delay or failure in establishing communications. The inability to contact the ground unit may prevent an aviator from obtaining vital safety of flight or tactical information which may easily result in loss of life, loss of equipment, and failure of the mission.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must insure that the current SOI in effect is adhered to at all times. If a valid requirement exists for changing an SOI item, the Division Signal Officer must be notified immediately and information disseminated to all interested agencies.

ITEM: Night airmobile operations can be conducted safely and effectively if proper attention is given to planning, method of control, and training.

DISCUSSION: Night airmobile operations, when properly planned and executed, give friendly forces a tactical and psychological advantage over the enemy. Although night operations are inherently more dangerous than daylight operations, detailed planning, reconnaissance, and ample notice to the supporting aviation unit will assure a smooth and coordinated execution of the commander's plan. Plans for a night operation must include the following:

1. Careful study of the tactical situation to determine if a night airmobile assault is desireable.

2. Selection of LZ's that support the tactical situation and enhance the safety of the operation from the aviation view, i.e., minimum barriers and constructions, fairly dust free and larger than daylight LZs.

3. A thorough reconnaissance of the LZ both day and night.

4. Selection of means for terminal guidance, i.e., Pathfinders, searchlights, and etc.

5. Weather and intelligence reports.

6. A complete and thorough briefing which is attended by all elements participating in the night operation.

A positive means of control must be exercised throughout the entire operation. Special emphasis must be placed on the following area:

1. Terminal guidance in the LZ. Pathfinders, arty illumination, or aircraft flares may be used for terminal guidance.

2. Selection of routes and check points.

3. Utilization of gunships. Friendly positions at night must be carefully marked before gunships are utilized.

OBSERVATION: Night combat airmobile assault operations should be conducted whenever the tactical plan of an infantry battalion or brigade lends itself to this tactic. Planning must be thorough and complete and early coordination effected between the ground unit and supporting aviation unit.

ITEM: Armed Helicopter Night Operations

DISCUSSION: Employment of gunships at night falls into three major categories: On combat assaults as escorts for troop carrying helicopters, in a close combat support role as an emergency reaction force and as escort aircraft for a helicopter which has a target detecting capability at night, i.e., starlight scope,

flares or lights. The most difficult problem encountered is the positive identification of a target at night. Even though communications are established with either the supported ground unit or another acquiring agency, directing the gunships on to the location of the target continues to be a difficult task. Some of the methods used recently have proven quite successful under given situations.

1. Positive identification of the supported ground element by using the ARC-54 homing device.

2. Visual identification by the ground commander of the fire team when overhead by using the aircraft landing lights or rotating beacon.

3. Firing a burst of tracer rounds by the unit on the ground provides location of friendly unit as well as direction and approximate location of the target.

4. If pathfinders are used direction and distance to the target can be obtained by using a landing LZ as a reference.

5. When flares are used and the target is visually identified by the gunships, a short burst of tracers and the direction of the attack should be confirmed by the ground commander for possible corrections.

OBSERVATION: Weather conditions change rapidly during the approaching monsoon seasons and pilots must continually be alert to fog and low cloud formations at night. Target positions can become quite serious at night. Pilots must keep their heads moving and not permit their eyes to become fixed on a target area.

ITEM: Deceptive Attacks by the Enemy

DISCUSSION: When the enemy becomes aware that friendly units are deploying to surround his positions, he will initiate probing attacks to cause friendly units to maneuver to eliminate the seemingly small pocket of resistance. As friendly units maneuver, the enemy will escape around the friendly maneuver element.

OBSERVATION: Units must be alert to continually cover all possible escape routes available to the enemy even while maneuvering against a known enemy location.

(c) (FOUO) Organization and Training

ITEM: M-79 Grenade Launcher Training

DISCUSSION: No personnel within the 15th Engineer Battalion were qualified on the M-79 Grenade Launcher due to insufficient stores of ammunition at Fort Riley.

OBSERVATION: Provisions should be made prior to overseas deployment to qualify personnel with their individual weapon.

ITEM: Machine Gun Qualification

DISCUSSION: Due to accelerated training and rescheduling only the assigned machine gun crews (2 men MG) were range qualified.

OBSERVATION: Additional personnel should be crossed-trained on unit crew-served weapons and special weapons such as the M-79 Grenade Launcher, .45 Cal Pistol and M16A1 rifle.

AVDE-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ACS/CSFOR-65) (U)

ITEM: Modified Tank Crew

DISCUSSION: Combat engineer TOE authorizes a 3-man crew for the combat engineer vehicle. The 15th Engineer Battalion is equipped with the M843 Tank Dozer in lieu of the CEV, which requires a four man crew.

OBSERVATION: A modification to the personnel and equipment authorization should be incorporated to show a TOE position for a loader (Asst Gunner) and assign him a .45 Cal Pistol in place of present M-16E1 Rifle.

ITEM: Construction Training

DISCUSSION: Personnel of the 15th Engineer Battalion received no training in Theater of Operations Construction methods due to inability to obtain both materials and construction equipment.

OBSERVATION: All engineer units deploying to USARPAC should have extensive training in plane surveying, earth construction, road and airfield construction, drainage and culvert construction, placement of concrete and associated materials and basic construction. To accomplish training of construction methods such equipment as cement mixers, scrapers, bulldozers, scooploaders, air compressors and surveying instruments must be available. In addition, supplies such as cement, reinforcing rod, PSP, lumber and nails should be procured even if limited in quantity.

ITEM: Concurrent Training with Infantry Brigade

DISCUSSION: The 15th Engineer Battalion participated in no training with infantry brigades or other elements while at Fort Riley because the brigades were not far enough along in their training cycles to permit concurrent training with engineer companies. All training, therefore, was unit training within the battalion.

OBSERVATION: The Combat Engineer TOE is organized to support each of the three division maneuver elements with an engineer line company. It is therefore imperative for both the maneuver element and engineer personnel to train together prior to overseas shipment to a combat zone.

ITEM: Advance Unit Training

DISCUSSION: The advance unit training cycle for the 15th Engineer Battalion was to consist of two (2) 5½ day weeks. The final result was 8½ days AUT and 3 days Army Training Test.

OBSERVATION: Compensatory time should be granted to units prior to deployment to make up training lost due to command inspections, Army Training Test and lack of equipment and training facilities.

(d) (C) Intelligence

ITEM: Evaluation of captured documents

DISCUSSION: Evaluation of captured documents can often be a slow and tedious process. A portion of this problem can be attributed to lack of an immediate means of evacuation. Other delays results from difficulties of relaying the readout from the location where the final evacuation is made.

OBSERVATION: It is important that captured documents receive immediate attention by unit intelligence personnel and interpreters but not at the expense of causing serious delays in evacuation to the next higher unit.

ITEM: Scope of Intelligence Gathering Activities

DISCUSSION: Tactical operations, to be successful against VC/NVA, must be predicated on the best and most recent intelligence available. Not only must S2/G2 personnel rely on their own capabilities; INTSUM's, bulletins and other publications from higher, lower and adjacent headquarters and the assistance of advisory personnel to ARVN and representatives to Area Coordination Centers must also be exploited to gain intelligence. By correlating the intelligence gathering efforts of all agencies, the chance for success of tactical operations can be greatly enhanced.

OBSERVATION: Intelligence must be sought or developed from every available source.

ITEM: Selection of Ambush Sites

DISCUSSION: Selection of ambush sites should be based on current intelligence. When current intelligence is not available, land or water routes of communication showing evidence of heavy use should be used to guide selection. The use of this criteria does not negate the requirement to locate ambush sites on likely avenues of approach into or withdrawal from key installations or activities regardless of whether or not these avenues show evidence of use.

OBSERVATION: All intelligence collection agencies must be fully exploited to achieve desireable results from selection of ambush sites.

(e) (FOUO) Logistics

ITEM: Increasing Load capacity of MABTOC Tents

DISCUSSION: The standard floor frame for MABTOC tents does not have the strength necessary when they are used for messhalls or storage.

OBSERVATION: Replacing the 2" X 8" material with 6" X 8" material increases the load capacity to four tons per 16' X 32' tent.

ITEM: Maintenance

DISCUSSION: A number of vehicles and pieces of equipment which required support maintenance remained on deadline status for an excessive length of time.

OBSERVATION: The number of vehicles on deadline was lowered appreciably when one or two company mechanics helped mechanics at support maintenance. Valuable experience was also gained by the organisational mechanics which could apply to their jobs on the organizational level.

ITEM: Supply of repair parts for radios

DISCUSSION: PLL stockage is too low to meet all the needs of organizational maintenance. Many parts are not authorized for stockage because of too few end items. The parts, however, are still needed for repairs. When test meters are not accurate enough, a method of substituting parts must be used to pinpoint trouble spots. This necessitates a fairly complete stockage of spare parts.

OBSERVATION: Repair parts should be stocked at organizational level to the extent that a part is on hand for every maintenance operation authorized at that echelon.

AVDE-MH CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

ITEM: Receipt of TOE - Incomplete Inventory

DISCUSSION: When TOE equipment such as pioneer sets, carpenter sets, demolition kits, automotive tool kits, general mechanic tool sets and organizational vehicles were issued they were found to be lacking many component items including complete sets of OEM tools i.e., all AVLB's issued without OEM. The filling of inventories was hampered by an absence of many items at the Fort Riley Self-Service Supply. As a result units within the battalion deployed overseas with numerous items missing from component tool sets and vehicles, therefore affecting the Mission Effectiveness of the unit.

OBSERVATION: All efforts should be made to complete tool and supply inventories of units deploying from CONUS as re-supply within the Theater of Operation is uncertain and often impossible.

ITEM: Equipment Loading

DISCUSSION: Much time was lost when loading TOE equipment onto railway cars due to the fact that once cars were loaded there was no way to move them out and move empty cars to the loading dock.

OBSERVATION: To facilitate loading procedures a switch engine would be available to shuttle railway cars to and from the loading docks.

ITEM: Late Issue of Equipment and Supplies

DISCUSSION: Numerous component items and parts arrived after the initial shipment of equipment. Therefore problems were encountered in packing these items with either Red "T.T" or Yellow "T.T" baggage.

OBSERVATION: Provisions should be made as packing lists are prepared to foresee the issue or pickup of late arriving supplies and equipment.

ITEM: Individual Clothing and Equipment Packing List

DISCUSSION: Upon deployment it was observed that the Red "T.T Duffel Bag was less the ½ full and the Yellow "T.T" Duffel Bag was overfull. Since travel uniform excluded all field equipment additional baggage was added to the individuals load. Naval and MSTS vessels offer optional wearing of low quarter shoes which were packed in Red "T.T" Bags and thus unavailable to troops on board ship.

OBSERVATION: Recommend changes to packing individual Clothing and equipment

ITEM:	A B.G	B BAG	WORN
Belt, Trousers, Ctn web		1	1
Boots, Combat		1	1
Buckle, web belt, brass			1
Cap, Garrison, wool		1	
Cap, utility, OG	1		1
Drawers, cotton, OG	4		1
Handerchief, cotton, OG	4		1
Insignia, branch of Svc, EP		1	
Insignia, BOS bronze, US		2	
Raincoat, nylon, taupe		1	
Shirt, cotton, uniform, twill SH 1, Short sleeve		2	
Shirt, utility, OG 107	3		1
Shoe, dress, oxford	3		
Socks, cotton, black	1	2	

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CIFOR-65) (U)

ITEM:	A B.G	B B.G	CORN
Socks, cushion sole, black	3	2	1
Towel, bath, cotton, OG	2	2	
Trousers, ctn, sateen, OG, 107	3		1
Trousers, ctn, uniform, twill khaki		2	
Undershirt, cotton, OG	4		1
Armor, body protection, groin		1	
Armor, body protection, neck, torso	1		
Bag, water-proof, clothing	1		
Belt, individual equipment	1		
Belt, pistol		1	
Blanket, bed, wool, OG 118		1	
Canteen, cup, and cover	1		
Cap, field, cotton		1	
Carrier, intrenching tool		1	
Case, field, first aid			1
Case, sleeping bag	1		
Case, SA ammo, universal	22		
Coat, man's, ctn WRS, OG 107		1	
Field pack	1		
Mess kit, w/knife, fork, & spoon	1		
Glasses, sun, spectacle			1
Gloves, lthr strap closing		1	
Hat and mosquito net		1	
Helmet, steel, w/cover, camouflage, band camouflage, liner	1		
Insect bar		1	
Intrenching toll		1	
Knife, pocket			1
Mattress, Pneumatic		1	
Overshoes, rubber		1	
Poncho, OG	1		
Rucksack		1	
Shelter, half, tent w/pets & poles		1	
Shoe, safety		1	
Sleeping Bag		1	
Sling, carrying bag		1	
Suspenders, field pack	1		
Individual weapon			1
OPTIONAL FOR OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS			
Coat, AG 344, (Lightweight)		1	
Trousers, AG 344, (Lightweight)		1	
Coat, summer tan		1	
Trousers, summer tan		1	

ITEM: Transfer of Equipment from Port of Entry to Base Camp

DISCUSSION: The transfer of equipment from port of entry to base camp involves problems concerned primarily with coordination, security, communication and local traffic conditions necessitate specific truck routes. Convoys are mandatory for security reasons. Drivers are not familiar with traffic signs, regulations and routes. Usually docks are crowded which adds to the confusion of unloading and requires rapid clearance of off-loaded vehicles, equipment and supplies.

OBSERVATION: The task of equipment transfer should be given to a unit as a mission. This provides for the retention of an experienced and workable chain of command. It is extremely important that an officer accompany the group to the dock. It is also advisable to place an officer at an intermediate point along the route and one at the base camp to provide constant and reliable communication and coordination. The OIC should be thoroughly familiar with local traffic regulations and routes and should be given ample time to prepare assignments and brief members of his command.

AVDE-H CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR) (U)

ITEM: Equipment - deferred arrival; late changes in authorizations (MTOE); requirement for applying Modification Work Orders (MWO); and arrival of equipment requiring organizational and direct support maintenance.

DISCUSSION: The conditions stated in this problem resulted in workloads for selected supply and maintenance elements of Support Command which would have exceeded the capability of the unit under fully manned and trained conditions.

OBSERVATION: Cadre personnel were divided into two 12-hour mission work shifts working a 7 day week. Diversion of cadre to mission work detracted from their intended purpose for training of newly assigned personnel. Equipment should be phased into a newly activated division at an early date in serviceable condition.

ITEM: Organizational Maintenance During Field Operations

DISCUSSION: On several occasions, supported units have left all their organizational maintenance personnel in base camp, depriving themselves of a maintenance capability. Consequently, forward support companies were requested to perform such jobs as changing a flat tire. Normal workloads will not permit support personnel to perform the organizational maintenance of supported units.

OBSERVATION: Emphasis must be placed on the need for organizational maintenance personnel accompanying their units on field operations.

ITEM: TOE petroleum handling equipment is not sufficient, either in type or in quantity to meet divisional requirements.

DISCUSSION: TOE equipment was evidently tailored to the concept of an Infantry Division engaged in conventional warfare. Further, the TOE equips the POL section to handle only two bulk fuels in small quantities. Upon arrival in RVN it became necessary to store and issue fuels, in much larger quantities than organic tankage permits. Additional equipment must be obtained in order to operate satisfactorily. However, until the necessary equipment arrives, there are certain steps which can be taken to alleviate the problem.

OBSERVATION: When possible, use organic 5000 gallon tank semi-trailers for storage. Use small capacity pumps (50 GPM) to handle those products for which there are fewest bulk transfers. Use 500 gallon collapsible tanks to supplement storage. Build up drum stocks of packaged fuels to supplement storage capacity.

ITEM: Limited storage capacity causes a high product turnover. This high rate requires that frequent small deliveries be made by the supporting units.

DISCUSSION: Such an arrangement increases the probability that an error will be made, resulting in commingling of products by putting them into the wrong tank. Such probability was reduced by adopting the following procedures.

OBSERVATION: All incoming tankers are sampled to determine beyond doubt the product they contain. Tanks into which the product is discharged are numbered and colorcoded. This permits yard workers to identify immediately the product in the tank. The numbering system further permits control of assigning tanks to a particular fuel service. When a tank is changed from one service to another, the Petroleum Officer need know only the tank number. From his records, he can determine what products have been kept in the tank, and can readily decide what preparation is needed for placing the tank in new service.

ITEM: The Class III Section had been called upon to render a large amount of retail service, even though it is equipped for wholesale operations.

DISCUSSION: Equipment and manpower has been sorely strained by the requirement for expanded retail service. While normally giving retail service to only those units which do not possess bulk hauling capability, circumstances have demanded individual refueling service to rear echelon vehicles when unit tankers are away from the base camp. Also, the Class III Section has of necessity, provided complete aircraft refueling service. In addition, the refueling of 5 gallon cans and 55 gallon drums for mess halls, generators, etc, has placed a heavy burden upon facilities already overtaxed. Several approaches have been taken to stretch resources to meet these requirements.

OBSERVATION: 1. In order to take pressure off the vehicle refueling points and permit faster service to customers, 5 gallon cans and 55 gallon drums are refilled only when time permits. A direct exchange point has been established so that customers may exchange empty cans for full ones.

2. While heliport refueling operations are not within the normal scope of Class III Section, being the only available unit capable of establishing aircraft refueling points, the Class III Section provided this service. By using a 5000 gallon semi-trailer and 1½" hoseline, and manifolding the tanker into a system of 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks, a workable refueling station was established which gave nozzle service to three helipads. Acquisition of a few small capacity tanks, allowed the service to be expanded to a point where eighteen helicopters could refuel simultaneously.

3. Inauguration of 24 hour service permitted a spreading of the workload, thereby reducing the strain on manpower and equipment.

ITEM: Condensation becomes a serious problem by causing contamination of fuels

DISCUSSION: High temperature and humidity cause the formation of water in POL containers. Water, especially in aviation and diesel fuels, can cause equipment failure. In meeting this problem, the following solutions have been useful.

OBSERVATION: 1. All products are filtered whenever possible. Normally, enough equipment is not available to filter all products at all times, so the greatest emphasis is placed on aviation fuels. Diesel fuel is filtered whenever equipment is available.

2. Containers are kept full to prevent formation of condensation.

3. Since this climate is especially conducive to the formation of condensation, filter-separation must remove greater quantities of water than normal. Therefore, filter elements are kept on hand to meet this increased demand. Filter-seperator down-time is thereby reduced to a minimum.

ITEM: Unusually dusty conditions in Vietnam create severe maintenance problems.

DISCUSSION: On unpaved roads and in base camps where traffic is moderate to heavy, dust quickly becomes a serious problem to the health and comfort of personnel, and in the maintenance of equipment. The following steps will minimize the condition and resulting adverse effect:

OBSERVATION: Establish and enforce rigid traffic control patterns which route vehicles away from living areas. Set and enforce low speed limits. Locate those maintenance activities which need dust free conditions in vans, quonset huts, or similar structures. Sprinkle roads periodically with contaminated POL products, or standard dust palliatives. Furnish drivers with goggles and insure that all equipment operators perform daily maintenance of air and fuel filters. Supervisors of maintenance activities must pursue a daily program of enforcing high stanards of cleanliness.

ITEM: A very high demand rate for track and track vehicle suspension components has been experienced.

DISCUSSION: Tracked vehicles, especially M113's are frequently damaged by mines, creating very high demands for all types of track and suspension components. Many of these components have a low failure rate during normal usage.

OBSERVATION: Stocks of track vehicle suspension components should exceed by as much as two thirds of the requisitioning objective indicated by technical manuals.

ITEM: Deferred Arrival of Equipment

DISCUSSION: Many mission essential items of communication, aviation and related equipment were received either immediately prior to deployment or not at all. This resultant impact meant that equipment was not available for training and operator experience had to be acquired under combat conditions after arrival in country.

OBSERVATION: Items of equipment requiring extensive operator training should be made available to units well before deployment.

ITEM: Shipment of Red Circle T.T

DISCUSSION: Red Circle T.T shipment restrictions were devulged by port authorities approximately one month prior to deployment of the first increment. To stay within cargo weight and size limitations, it was necessary to determine the storage capacity of each surface vessel supporting the move and the priorities for equipment needed upon arrival in country.

OBSERVATION: Once cargo limitations and equipment priorities are determined, detailed unit planning must be accomplished to insure that required equipment is available upon arrival at the overseas destination.

ITEM: Outloading Equipment for Overseas Movement

DISCUSSION: After alert for overseas movement several division initiated actions greatly facilitated equipment outloading.

1. Instruction was presented to selected personnel from all units on the following:

   a. Preparation of required administration

   b. Vehicular internal load limitations

   c. Organization of outloading teams

   d. Rail loading procedures

2. Transportation representatives held planning conference to resolve and publish:

   a. Dates and times for outloading

   b. Allocations of outloading areas

   c. Routes to be used from unit locations to outloading areas.

OBSERVATION: Proper planning and timely dissemination of outloading instructions prior to deployment facilitates maximum utilization of training time and equipment.

ITEM: Helicopter Refueling for Airmobile Operations

DISCUSSION: Past airmobile operations have indicated that multiple helicopter refueling points are required at each heliport from which airmobile operations are conducted. The tactical employment of division requires two helicopter refueling areas at brigade forward locations in addition to the division heliport at the base camp. Ultimately, the task for providing the fuel dispensing equipment was assigned to the aviation battalion.

1. A minimum of 10 refueling points for JP-4 are required at each heliport to adequately support airmobile operations.

2. By a 100% commitment of its organic refueling equipment, the aviation battalion was able to provide the equipment for the required number of refueling points at the two forward heliports, however, the refueling capability of the base heliport was reduced. Also, with all the battalion's refueling equipment already committed, there is no reserve equipment for replacement in case of breakdown or combat loss, or to establish a forward refueling area to support a temporary operation.

OBSERVATION: 1. The aviation battalion TOE provides sufficient personnel and equipment to provide refueling facilities full time at one heliport which is normally the division heliport. Additional refueling equipment is provided to permit the establishment of another forward refueling area, however, sufficient personnel are not authorized by TOE to operate this equipment on a full time basis. The aviation battalion is not organized to provide and operate more than one full-time heliport.

2. In order to provide the additional helicopter refueling areas required by the division, the aviation battalion must be provided with additional tactical aircraft refueling equipment and additional personnel.

ITEM: Aircraft Maintenance Procedures

DISCUSSION: The established goal for aircraft availability is 70%. During February, March, and early April, 16 out of 25 aircraft were made available to the division every day with an average flight time of 110-120 hours per aircraft/month. It was soon realized that helicopter utilization was higher than average in Vietnam and that maintenance requirements were unable to support this number of flying hours on a continued basis. Although maintenance is performed 24 hours a day, mandatory periodic airframe and engine inspections drastically reduced the number of available aircraft during the middle of April. All aircraft were assigned to the division directly from the factory in a short period of time. Continuous commitment and required transfer inspection prior to arrival in-country did little to stagger the flying time. This resulted in a number of airframes and engine inspections all due at the same time forcing a very low availability rate about the middle of April. As the aircraft completed the mandatory inspection an automatic spacing took place which resulted in a spread of flying hours between aircraft. With careful scheduling during the next few months the problem should lessen considerably thereby facilitating support of requirements at the next major periodic inspection.

OBSERVATION: 1. Aircraft times have to be spaced and maintenance requirements staggered in order to maintain the desired availability.

2. High daily aircraft commitments on a continuous basis will eventually result in grounding of entire fleet for a period of time.

3. To sustain an acceptable aircraft availability rate, it is mandatory that aircraft be released on time from operational missions so that proper maintenance can be performed.

(f) (FOUO) Other

ITEM: The task of obtaining publications for a newly activated unit is unnecessarily difficult.

DISCUSSION: A new unit must requisition all publications one by one after establishing an account at the Baltimore and St Louis publications centers. Piecemeal requisitioning assures the presence of catalogs in those units. These indexes are the most difficult publications to obtain. Opening an account includes the submission of the general order activating the unit for use as a basis for an initial issue of publications.

OBSERVATION: That a system be s t up whereby , a newly activated unit, upon opening a pin-point distribution account at the AG Publication Centers, is automatically issued a complete set of the DA Pamphlet 310-series, and all regulations appropriate to its size; i.e., A distribution to companies, and B distribution to battalions, etc. The cost of such a system would be small when compared to the price of man-hours spent preparing multiple, many page requisitions, many of which must be later corrected because of outdated data.

ITEM: Whip Antenna Maintenance

DISCUSSION: Whip antennas have a tendency to corrode at junctions where the sections are fastened together. This prohibits electrical conduction and tends to fuse the parts together. When this occurs, an attempt to force the antenna apart usually results in breaking it.

OBSERVATION: Whip antennas should be taken apart and cleaned at frequent intervals, and the frequency should be increased in damp weather.

ITEM: Removal of Eiffel Bridges

DISCUSSION: Because of the construction of the Eiffel Bridge, it cannot cantilever out over an open gap in the same fashion as the Bailey Bridge. The bottoms of the Eiffel truss will bend when the entire bridge is supported on rollers from one bank.

OBSERVATION: In the case where the bridge has intermediate supports, this problem was solved by placing Bailey plain rollers on all bends and both abutments. In the case of Eiffel Bridge with no intermediate supports, the problem was solved by supporting one end of the bridge with a crane and pulling the bridge over to the opposite side on Bailey Bridge plain rollers, using an armored personnel carrier.

ITEM: Rolling an Eiffel Bridge off its abutments on plain rollers

DISCUSSION: The Eiffel truss is constructed so that the vertical and diagonal members extend below horizontal members where they are riveted to the gusset plate. This small protusion (about $\frac{1}{2}$") is enough to prevent the bridge from rolling evenly over the plain rollers.

OBSERVATION: To solve this problem it was decided to cut the metal off even with the lower horizontal member. After cutting the protrusions off with an acetylene torch, the Eiffel rolls freely on plain rollers.

ITEM: Bailey Bridge Construction in the Mekong Delta

DISCUSSION: Roads in the Mekong Delta are characteristically narrow and sharply built up at bridges to allow boat passage under bridges. The rice paddy mud is too soft to support vertical walls on new abutments.

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OBSERVATION: As the Bailey Bridge is constructed the work gets higher up in the air as it progresses. This cannot be avoided, so the bridge must be kept out over the gap as much as possible. There is usually no room for a site layout and the bridge must be loaded in dump trucks in bay loads and removed with a crane. Support of abutment wing walls was accomplished by attaching them to each other with a cable.

ITEM: Rice Paddy and Cement Test Mixture

DISCUSSION: 1. Test #1 - A mix of 15% cement and 85% rice paddy soil was allowed to set for 48 hours. The result showed there was not a uniform mixture. The top few inches were dry and crumbly, the bottom few inches did not dry out. The sample had very little strength.

2. Test #2 - A mix of 25% cement and 75% rice paddy soil was allowed to set for 48 hours. The amount of clay in the soil caused an uneven mix and the sample crumbled on impact with a wooden mallet.

OBSERVATION: Cement does not appear to be the answer for stabilizing rice paddy soil. The clay tended to hold a large amount of water and would not give a firm bind. The properties of the test sample would vary throughout the same samples.

ITEM: Installation of a 1600' X 60' Airfield Utilizing M8A1 Metal Planking

DISCUSSION: Some problems developed in the placement of the M8A1 planks on the airfield in that the planks were manufactured by four different firms (Kaiser Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Syro and Pickard). The locking lugs varied in size and spacing on the various manufactured planks. Considerable time and effort was expended inlocking the planks together properly. It was also found that a crown on the runway of more than 2% hindered the alignment of the planking and also added some to the problem of proper locking of the lugs.

OBSERVATION: If possible M8A1 planking manufactured by one firm should be used in the completion of a desired project unless it is not feasible to do so, because of the size of the project and amount of M8A1 matting available.

ITEM: Four Man Portable Bunkers, Skid Mounted

DISCUSSION: Wooden bunkers constructed of timber, 6" X 6" X RL and 4" X 6" X RL and other large sizes are now being built and mounted on wooden skids. Doing this gives the perimeter security forces the ability to move their bunkers concurrently with an expanding perimeter, brought about by the dredging activities presently under way at Dong Tam. The bunkers can easily be hauled around and put in place, by being towed with a dozer. Once the bunkers are in place they can then be sandbagged. The wooden frame of the bunker provides support for the sandbags.

OBSERVATION: Bunkers constructed in a way that they can be moved easily are less vulnerable to attack on the perimeter because they do not have to stay in any one place as a permanent bunker. The positions of the bunkers can be easily changed by use of a dozer towing them from one position to another.

ITEM: Observation/Firing Tower

DISCUSSION: Towers capable of holding four men and their equipment were built on skids in 2 carpenter yards then towed to the site by dozer. They are made so they can be sandbagged on all four sides if necessary to prevent small arms fire from penetrating the tower.

OBSERVATION: The towers held up remarkably well with all the moving around they encountered. It is necsary to use 12" spikes in the tower construction. Before moving the tower the sandbags must be removed and then replaced after

the tower has been moved into its new location. Where the land is flat, elevating a man even 10' gives him the ability to see a great distance. The towers are extremely useful at night.

ITEM: AVLB Radio Communications

DISCUSSION: Radio communication with the AVLB was very poor with the original antenna and the antenna was also susceptible to breakage in jungle operations. The old antenna was composed of three mast sections (MS-116A, MS 117A, H 118A) and the mast base MB-15/GR. It was mounted on the front deck of the vehicles.

OBSERVATION: Another antenna was substituted for the original, the AT-912/VRC with antenna matching unit MK-2799/VRC. Radio reception and transmission have improved immensely (20-30 KM as compared to ½-1 KM). Because it is flexible and mounted at the rear of the overhead cylinder, the possibility of breakage was also reduced. An MIR is currently in the process of being submitted on this modification.

ITEM: Peneprime

DISCUSSION: This unit has been given the mission of dust control in Camp Martin Cox. A mixture is applied consisting of MC-3 asphalt cutback and diesel fuel, MC-3 and JP-4 fuel, or MC-0 cutback alone based on the availability of cutback. The application is made to all areas where dust is a problem to include parking areas, roads and helipads.

OBSERVATION: To be an effective means of dust control:

1. The area to be treated must be prepared in advance with a grader and excess dust must be removed.

2. Traffic must be kept off the freshly treated area for at least two days to allow the cutback to cure.

3. The mixture cannot be applied to a wet surface as it will not be absorbed nor should it be applied prior to expected rain as the material will be washed away.

4. The amount of mixture applied (gal/sq yd) should be varied from 0.35 to 0.85 depending on the absorption qualities of the surface to be sprayed.

ITEM: Primer Vent Scoring - 155mm Howitzer

DISCUSSION: The battalion was plagued with a rash of howitzer failures due to primer vent bushing scoring. The demand for new vents soon depleted the batteries' PLL and exhausted the supply system temporarily.

OBSERVATION: The primary cause of these failures was traced to several lots of primers which did not meet specifications for minimum outside diameter of the cartridge body. Other contrubuting factors may be extensive firing of maximum charge and aggravation caused by powder fouling. Operational requirements may preclude firing lesser charges but scrupulous cleaning of the primer vent between missions, or between rounds if possible, with an M-16 bore brush is helpful.

ITEM: 24 Hour Fire Direction Center Operations

DISCUSSION: The battalion TOE does not provide sufficient officer and enlisted personnel to maintain 24 hour FDC operations both at battery and battalion level.

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OBSERVATION: By combining all fire direction personnel into a central FDC at battalion it is possible to organize three complete crews consisting of a Chief Computer, HCO, VCO, four computers and two RTO's. These crews operate three 8 hour shifts daily. The two liaison officers and assistant S-3 act as fire direction officers each working an eight hour shift. Additional officers (such as Bn S-2, Survey Officer) and enlisted personnel (Survey Section) may be trained in FDC procedures to provide replacements in depth. When batteries operate separately their battery FDC's may be augmented from the battalion FDC pool. Advantages of this system are readily apparent:

1. Centralized control

2. Uniform training and procedures

3. Increased difficiency and alertness through shorter hours and less fatigue.

4. Flexibility

5. Training in depth

ITEM: Officer Requirement for 24 hour Operation of Seperate Batteries

DISCUSSION: Each firing battery under TOE 6-165 is authorized only 3 officers. When the battery is deployed separately from the battalion and must operate its own FDC, or when the battery is split into two platoons, 3 officer cannot provide proper supervision for extended periods. The nature of the war in Vietnam, with friends and enemy intermingled, requires extremely close coordination and "double checks" of all fire direction and clearance procedures as well as execution of fire commands at the howitzers. The nightly H&I program added to normal daylight activities, requires that an officer be active and alert at the firing battery area 24 hours a day. With only 3 officers, and excluding absences due to illness, injury, or R & R, the Battery Commander must pull a shift at the howitzer position, thus detracting from his many command duties.

OBSERVATION: A short-term solution is to loan the Battalion Ammunition Officer or Assistant Communication Officer to the firing battery to act as AMO. A long-term solution is to provide an additional Lieutenant, MOS 1193, AMO, per firing battery. Such request has been initiated.

ITEM: Howitzer Stability in Firing Position - 155mm Howitzer

DISCUSSION: The loosely packed soil in the Bearcat area of Vietnam enables the 155mm howitzer to move back excessively during firing - especially in the rainy season.

OBSERVATION: During field operations this problem may be alleviated by placing the howitzer on a mound or building up under the firing jack and digging the trail spades down. This causes the recoil forces to be exerted more downward than rearward and greatly improves stability. In base camp situations a hexagonal platform of two thicknesses of 2" X 8" lumber has been placed under each howitzer. This platform is placed over a mound of carefully packed laterite and trail spades are dug down and braced by sections of telephone poles or cement filled sandbags. This method has almost completely eliminated the wet weather emplacement problems.

2. (C) Commander's Recommendations

a. The activation, organization, equipping, training and deployment of the 9th Infantry Division represented a monumental task and challenge.

In retrospect, the concept for accomplishment of the task proved sound. However, an analysis of execution of the concept revealed several problem areas could have been averted if the following recommendations could have been implemented:

(1) Organize the support command 60-90 days prior to organizing the remainder of the division.

(2) Insure that sufficient cadre personnel of required grade and experience are on station prior to organizing a unit.

(3) Insure that equipment necessary for training is available and on hand prior to the initiation of training.

(4) Assign only trained personnel to hard skill MOS positions.

(5) Implement an MTOE prior to entering Unit Training.

(6) Resolve deployability criteria as early as possible.

b. The division had one brigade operational in Vietnam by 1 January, a second by mid-January and a third by early February. The desired initial impact on the counterinsurgency effort after arrival was not realized for several reasons. Initially, organic helicopter support was not available and pressures of higher priority operations such as CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY negated full support of division operations from non-divisional resources. Secondly, one brigade was committed to high priority operations outside the division area for the better part of the reporting period. Thirdly, the requirement to provide a battalion for security of Long Binh Post, a battalion for operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone and a battalion for security of dredging operations at Dong Tam diffused the effort of a second brigade. To unsure success of an assigned mission in a counterinsurgency environment, it is recommended that sufficient forces and resources be provided to:

(1) Effectively saturate areas of operation in cooperation with GVN forces.

(2) Convince the enemy through the vigor of offensive and accompanying psychological operations that he faces defeat.

(3) Maintain momentum of the offensive on a seven-day-a-week, around-the-clock basis.

(4) Open, secure and use both land and water lines of communication while at the same time denying their use to the enemy.

(5) Destroy all Viet Cong installations.

(6) Manifest a greater strength than that of the enemy, thereby, causing the population to gravitate to the GVN.

c. Success achieved while operating in close proximity to civilian population centers have prompted the following recommendations:

(1) Preclude inflation of the local economy by confining US purchases to PX outlets.

(2) Resolve fixed prices through district/province level when it is necessary to use services provided by civilian enterprise.

(3) Conduct frequent tactical operations in cooperation with GVN military units.

(4) Monitor and assist Revolutionary Development Teams by gearing tactical operations where possible, to complement those of the RD Program.

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(5) Conduct extensive Civic Action Operations to include MEDCAPS, DENTCAPS and technical assistance and construction materials as available to maintain lines of communication, reopen market places, schools, etc.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

M W. Kendall

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Appendixes
1 thru 33

M. W. KENDALL
Colonel, Infantry
Chief of Staff

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AVFBC-H 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 9th Infantry Division, 30 April 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 28 JUL 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, page 28, Item - Modified Tank Crew: USARV approved MTOE provided 9th Div fills from its own resources.

b. Reference Section II, page 39, Item - Additional Officer Requirement for 24 hour operation of Separate Batteries: USARV approved MTOE with the same stipulation given in para 2a.

c. Reference Section II, page 32, Item - TOE Petroleum Handling Equipment: Problem received staff study by II FFORCEV G4 on 20 May. Permanent type installation equipment was requested. This would release TOE items for use at the helipads.

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the comments, recommendations and action taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E M McGRATH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

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Report received at Hqs, DA without indorsements from intermediate headquarters above II Field Force Vietnam.

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